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INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration is an ancient method of resolving disputes 
privately between parties who agree to the jurisdiction of an 
impartial tribunal.1 In medieval times, the ancient Greeks 
submitted their disputes to the Oracle at Delphi. Even after the 
Roman Conquest, arbitration continued to be the favored method 
of dispute resolution among the Greeks.2 At the bedrock of 
arbitration is the single pillar of consent.3 Coercion, then, is 
antithetical to the fundamental tenets of arbitration because the 
common understanding is that there must be an agreement to 
 
 
* J.D. LL.M., Admiralty and Maritime  Law,  Assistant  Professor  of 
Law, Arizona Summit Law School. 
1. JOSEPH F. MORRISSEY & JACK M. GRAVES, International Sales Law 
and Arbitration: Problems, Cases, and Commentary 31 (Wolters Kluwer 
2010). 
2. W. L. Westermann, Interstate Arbitration in Antiquity, 2 CLASSICAL 
J., no. 5, Mar. 1907, at 198 (“The honor therefore of first formulating the 
principle of interstate arbitration and of first putting it into practice lies with 
the Greeks.”). 
3. See William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: 
An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: CONSENT, PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (Oxford 2009) (“Like 
consummated romance, arbitration rests on consent.”). 
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arbitrate.4 This agreement is generally contained in the parties’ 
contract after all parties have negotiated the essential terms, such 
as choice of law and choice of forum. Therefore, a party should not 
be compelled to arbitrate a claim absent that party’s informed 
consent. The contractual provision to arbitrate  confers  
jurisdiction on an arbitral tribunal or a panel of arbitrators and 
serves as the sole source of that authority.5 
Compared to litigation, arbitration is generally understood as 
a “friendly” forum where all parties have the power to choose the 
arbitrators. However, in recent times, this age-old dispute 
resolution mechanism has come under fire because arbitration is 
now viewed by many policymakers, lawyers, and a large segment 
of the population as a sword and not a shield.6 In the United 
States, there is a concerted effort among policy makers to create 
legislation that would eliminate forced arbitration as it relates to 
consumer, employment, and civil rights issues.7 These efforts 
resulted in the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act.8 The proposed 
legislation gained some support during the Obama  
administration, but appears to be still-born upon the ushering in 
of a new Republican administration.9 
The issue of forced arbitration cuts across the spectrum of 
society. In the area of commercial law, arbitration has always 
 
4. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 1, at 32 (“[T]hird parties 
cannot be required to participate in arbitration without express consent.”). 
5. See Park, supra note 3, at 3 (“For arbitrators, motions to join non- 
signatories create a tension between two principles: maintaining arbitration’s 
consensual nature, and maximizing an award’s practical effectiveness by 
binding related persons.”). 
6. See Interview by Jennifer D. Adams with Sen. Al Franken and Rep. 
Henry Johnson, in Gaining Ground, TRIAL: FORCED ARBITRATION, Jan. 2017, 
at 31, 31 (stating that replacing the judicial process with forced arbitration 
discards “the body of law and jurisprudence under which a decision can be 
made” and replaces this system with “a private, for profit, anything-goes type 
of system.”). 
7. See Jessica Guynn, “Enough is enough”: Gretchen Carlson says bill 
ending arbitration would break silence in sexual harassment cases, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
2017/12/06/bipartisan-bill-would-eliminate-forced-arbitration-break-silence- 
sexual-harassment-cases/925226001/. 
8. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. (2017). 
9. See Interview by Jennifer D. Adams, supra note 6, at 33 (recounting 
Rep. Johnson’s statement: “I believe that as long as Republicans control the 
House of Representatives, I see no prospects for the Arbitration Fairness Act 
to see the light of day.”). 
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been the preferred method of settling commercial disputes. 
However, in recent times, the decision to arbitrate has become a 
one-sided affair. In the maritime context, arbitration is frequently 
the preferred method of dispute resolution, and the arbitral 
process threatens to destabilize litigation in the world of shipping. 
Long respected as a unique and special “club,” maritime lawyers 
now find the doors of the courtroom closed.10 The fields of 
maritime law and arbitration are as old as the sea.11 However, 
maritime disputes, because of their complexity, have always been 
guided by a unique system of laws.12 
In modern maritime practice, the omnipresence of arbitration 
clauses that lie cloistered in the fine print of contracts across the 
commercial spectrum is giving rise to issues of fraud and 
unconscionability in maritime contracts. At bottom, the resistance 
is not about the arbitration itself, but the absence of consent 
among parties who were unaware that the doors of the courthouse 
would be closed in the event of a dispute.  Arbitration, then, is  
now viewed as a nemesis to litigation.13 This negative view of 
arbitration is amplified because the process is mired in secrecy. 
Compared to our system of litigation and our legal culture of 
transparency, a system that is characteristically non-transparent 
is vulnerable to attack particularly when the rights of weaker 
parties are juxtaposed against the might of a large corporation or 
 
 
10. See Interview by Jennifer D. Adams, supra note 6, at 32 (positing 
that arbitration is a good thing in principle and it pervades the shipping 
community; going into an arbitration or being drawn into one, is to enter a 
world of practice that is different from litigation, and some knowledge of 
arbitration is indispensable to the maritime lawyer). 
11. James Allsop, Chief Justice, Address to the 16th Conference of Chief 
Justices of Asia and the Pacific: Comity and Commerce (Nov. 8, 2015) 
(describing the development of commercial practices with regards to 
maritime trade, including the Laws of Manu circa 1500 BCE and the various 
customary codes of Greece and Egypt and the maritime law of the Rhodians 
within Justinian’s Digest). 
12. See NICHOLAS J. HEALY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 1 
(West 5th ed. 2012) (“In writings from Babylonian times until the collapse of 
the Roman empire, traces remain of a cluster of doctrines of maritime law 
that persist to this day.”). 
13. See Deepak Gupta, Fighting the Fine Print, TRIAL: FORCED 
ARBITRATION, Jan. 2017, at 24, 25 (“Over the last decade, corporations have 
used the fine print to block the courthouse doors by forcing consumers and 
employees into arbitration.”). 
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other powerful entities.14 
What’s even more troubling is the fact that over the last 
decade, the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
moved closer to favoring arbitration even where non-signatories to 
a contract have argued on the basis of consent. In its earlier 
jurisprudence, the Court has long recognized and reiterated that 
arbitration must be consensual under the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) and federal maritime law.15 
But, in maritime transactions, it is often difficult to identify 
all of the parties to a contract. Because maritime law is  sui 
generis international, the very nature of maritime transactions is 
based on a chain of transactions, which includes  multiple 
contracts with multiple parties across several countries. When a 
dispute arises from these contracts, the challenge of identifying 
the proper parties to the contract is more pronounced in 
international commercial arbitration.16 
Historically, the doctrine of privity of contract controls the 
obligations and rights of the parties to sue on a given contract.17 
Thus, the issue of jurisdiction over the parties is often a bone of 
contention for arbitral bodies. In international commercial 
arbitration, it is more likely than not that one of the parties will 
 
14. See Paul Bland & Dani Zylberberg, In the Dark: A System of Secrecy, 
TRIAL: FORCED ARBITRATION, Jan. 2017, at 40, 41 (“An open and transparent 
court system has long been a pillar of our democracy, guaranteeing fair 
proceedings . . . and ensuring public support and acceptance of the ‘means 
used to achieve justice.’”). 
15. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 
(2010) (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class 
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party 
agreed to do so.”); id. at 683 (“We think it is also clear from our precedents 
and the contractual nature of arbitration that parties may specify with whom 
they choose to arbitrate their disputes.”); see also EEOC v. Waffle  House, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of  
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). 
16. See CLARE AMBROSE, KAREN MAXWELL & ANGHARAD PARRY, LONDON 
MARITIME ARBITRATION 229 (Bruce Harris ed., 3d ed. 2009) (“In charter party 
or bill of lading contracts it is extremely common for the contract to be signed 
or concluded by an agent. . . . [I]t is important to take every precaution to 
ensure that any claim is asserted against the proper party. Any dispute as to 
the identity of the proper party to sue (or be sued) can normally be 
categorised as a jurisdictional issue . . . .”). 
17. See BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY AND CONTEXT 11 
(2012). 
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challenge the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the dispute based on 
the choice of forum or choice of law clauses. Often, this challenge 
to jurisdiction is raised on the basis that either one of the parties 
did not consent to arbitration or is not a signatory on the 
underlying contract.18 
This Article seeks to analyze the joinder of parties who are 
non-signatories in certain maritime contracts where these parties 
are seeking to avoid arbitration. This Article will grapple with the 
question of whether consent in international arbitration has been 
rendered irrelevant through the practice of joinder. At issue is 
whether the current practice of joining these non-signatories to 
arbitration disregards the fundamental principle of consent that is 
central to arbitration, and thus offends public policy both in the 
United States and internationally. 
Unlike litigation, there are no per se rules of joinder in the 
realm of arbitration, and non-signatories to an  underlying 
contract containing an arbitration clause, will resist the insistence 
by the opposing side to arbitrate. In recent times, however, 
arbitral tribunals have employed “joinder-like” instruments to join 
non-signatories to arbitration under the rubric of “deemed 
consent.”19 
Invoking language such as “commercial reality,” “economic 
reality,” corporate veil-piercing, alter-ego, and equitable principles 
of “estoppel” in myriad forms, courts and arbitral tribunals have 
legitimized the practice of joining non-signatories to arbitration.20 
While in practice, the borrowing of joinder rules serve the needs of 
uniformity in international commercial transactions, and 
international trade, the practice of joining non-signatories to 
arbitration has met with some hostility both in the United States, 
Britain, and other European countries.21 In fact, this  practice 
may offend the public policy of some countries, creating conflict of 
laws issues in the fractious space of international trade. 
 
18. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 75. 
19. See Park, supra note 3, at 8–9 (explaining the analysis arbitrators 
undertake to join non-signatories). 
20. See id. at 12 (“References to ‘surrogates’ or ‘substitutes’ for consent 
sometimes serve as catchphrases to explain joinder situations in which 
arbitrators or courts deem an arbitration agreement to  exist. However,  
sound doctrine should never countenance a suggestion that consent has 
somehow become irrelevant.”). 
21. Id. at 14. 
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This Article will analyze the issue of joinder under the 
principles of estoppel under United States law, the Group of 
Companies Doctrine adopted by some Continental legal systems,22 
and the English Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.23   
At the crux of this analysis is to what extent this practice disturbs 
the fundamental principles that form the basis of international 
public policy such as those rights enshrined in Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), The Right to a 
Fair Trial,24 the British Human Rights Act 1998,25 and American 
public policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).26 
The issue of joinder where a party is seeking to avoid 
arbitration will be explored through the lens of shipbroker 
contracts.27 Recently, in International Chartering, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals revisited the issue of joining non- 
signatories to arbitration.28 In predecessor cases to International 
Chartering, the court held that the joinder of a non-signatory to an 
arbitration proceeding without the party’s consent was in violation 
of American public policy.29 In Republic of Ecuador, the court 
explained that “a choice-of-law clause will govern where a 
nonsignatory to a particular arbitration agreement seeks to 
22. See Dow Chemicals v. Isover Saint-Gobain, 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 131, 
136 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. 1984) (a claim was brought not only by the companies 
who signed the arbitration agreement but also by their parent company and a 
French subsidiary in the same group). 
23. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, ch. 31 (Eng.), available 
at 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/31/pdfs/ukpga_19990031_en.pdf. 
24. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 
5 (Eur.). 
25. Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/pdfs/ukpga_19980042_en.pdf. 
26. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1925). 
27. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, Shipbrokers’ Commissions: Entitlement, 
Standing, and Jurisdiction, 24 TUL. MAR. L. J. 55, 55 (1999) (“Shipbrokers act 
as intermediaries and agents between owners and charterers of a vessel.”). 
28. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138  F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), remanded by 557 Fed. Appx. 81 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
29. See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 662 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “[a]n American nonsignatory cannot be bound to arbitrate in the 
absence of a full showing of facts supporting an articulable theory based on 
American contract law or American agency law”); see also Republic of Ecuador 
v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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enforce the agreement against a signatory, but not where a 
signatory seeks to enforce the agreement against a nonsignatory.”30 
International Chartering rests on the same footing.31 As in 
Republic of Ecuador, a signatory is asking the court to compel the 
non-signatory to arbitration. However, the court  announced that 
it was in fact, overruling itself in Republic of Ecuador based on the 
doctrine   of   direct   benefit   estoppel.32 Given this posture, 
shipbrokers must be diligent to ensure that they understand the 
standard language in the charter party form.33 According to 
International Chartering, the incorporation of commission terms34 
will bind brokers to the charter party, even where there is a 
change in ownership of the vessel, or where there is a separate 
agreement between the original owners and the brokers.35 
In   addition   to   the   issue   of   joinder   of   non-signatories, 
International   Chartering   raises   choice   of law  issues.36 The 
 
30. 376 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (emphasis added). 
31. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 635. 
32. See id. at 635–36 (reasoning that Republic of Ecuador was incorrect). 
33. See STEWART C. BOYD ET AL., SCRUTTON ON CHARTERPARTIES AND BILLS 
OF LADING 3 n.19 (21st ed. 2008) (“Charterparty: in medieval Latin, carta 
partita, an instrument written in duplicate on a single sheet and then divided 
by indented edges so that each part fitted the other.”). The legal relations 
between the owner of the vessel and the charterer are controlled by the 
charter party. Id. at 3, art. 3–4. In legal disputes, the terms of the charter 
party itself are controlling. See E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford v. M/V Alaia, 673 
F. Supp. 796, 799 (E.D. La. 1987) (“A charter party, such as the New York 
Produce Exchange time charter . . . is merely a form of contract and is 
generally subject to the rules and principles of construction for ordinary 
commercial contracts.”); see also Marine Overseas Servs., Inc. v. Crossocean 
Shipping Co., 791 F.2d 1227, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that a charter  
comes into existence when “the traditional elements of a contract are present” 
(citation omitted)). 
34. See Brokerage Commission: An Overview, FISHERS SOLICITORS (July 
22, 2011), http://www.fisherslondon.com/pages/news/index.asp?NewsID=50 
(“Brokerage commission is payable under a time charter on hire. Standard 
form charters will ordinarily stipulate that commission is only payable on 
hire that is both earned and paid (see for example the NYPE form). Subject 
to the precise wording of the charter, the broker’s entitlement to commission 
will therefore only arise when the charterers remit hire or it is recovered by 
some other means.”). 
35. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 642. According to 
Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., if the benefit sued upon (i.e., broker’s 
commission) depends on the charter party for its existence, then under the 
doctrine of direct benefit estoppel, the brokers will be deemed to consent to 
arbitration. Id. at 636. 
36. See id. at 635. 
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question for the court was whether federal maritime law or 
English law applied to the charter parties at issue.37 Both the 
District Court and the Second Circuit held that English law 
applied to the charter parties because if federal maritime law 
applied, the charter parties’ reference to “Owners and the 
Charterers” would not apply to the shipbrokers.38 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court’s decision revived the 
age old question of whether shipbroker contracts are “firmly 
entrenched” within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United 
States.39 The court held that under English law, the phrase 
“Owners and the Charterers” in the charter party includes 
shipbrokers, while in the United States, brokers are not 
characterized as such.40 Therefore, federal maritime law and 
English law will produce different outcomes, which compel a 
choice of law analysis.41 
The choice of law issues will be analyzed alongside the 
preliminary contracts doctrine under United States maritime law. 
This Article hopes to convey that the time has come for United 
States courts to decide whether federal maritime law applies ex 
propio vigore to shipbroker commissions. These contracts should 
be squarely within the ambit of admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of 
their symbiotic nature with the charter party. In addition to the 
admiralty jurisdiction question, International Chartering revives 
the thorny question as to the fairness of binding a non-signatory 
to a charter party which includes an arbitration choice of law 
clause. Acknowledging that the issue is fraught with uncertainty, 
the court concluded that English law governed the claims under 
the charter parties and ruled that the parties must bring their 
 
 
 
37. See id. at 634. 
38. See id. at 634, 642; id. at 634 (“This Court previously determined 
that under federal law, the charter parties’ arbitration clauses—which by 
their terms apply only to ‘Owners and the Charterers’—did not apply to 
Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit did not reverse that conclusion. ‘Were 
substantive federal maritime law to apply, [the District Court’s holding]  
might be correct.’” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)). 
39. Id. at 634. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (“Thus, as the Second Circuit held, ‘[s]ince English law and 
federal law produce different results, the choice of law analysis is  
essential.’”). 
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claims to arbitration in London.42 
The Second Circuit foreclosed a prime opportunity to clarify 
this area of law to the detriment of international maritime 
arbitration.43 International Chartering, with its implication of 
English law in the area of maritime jurisdiction as it relates to 
broker contracts, provided fertile ground for the court to offer a 
definitive response to the question of maritime jurisdiction over 
the so-called preliminary contracts doctrine.44 
The presence of a choice of law clause in International 
Chartering allowed the court to sidestep the issue of whether 
brokerage contracts are creatures of maritime law.45 The often- 
used alibi of international uniformity gave the court an “out” in 
this choppy area of admiralty jurisdiction, and the parties were 
sent out into the channels of English law.46 Where a dispute is 
international, courts favor arbitration, and even in situations 
where a party’s substantive rights are implicated, courts will 
subjugate the important issue of United States admiralty 
jurisprudence for the international principles of comity and 
uniformity.47 
Indeed, the court’s acknowledgment that English law will 
provide a remedy for the brokers in International Chartering, 
because they will be deemed as “owners” and “charterers” in 
England, begs the question of whether they should receive the 
same treatment under United States law.48 The court stated that 
International Chartering will not sound in admiralty because, 
under federal law, brokers and charterers are not included in the 
phrase “Owners and the Charterers,” but it stopped short of 
 
42. Id. at 642–43. 
43. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F. 
App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2014). 
44. See id. 
45. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
46. See id. at 642. 
47. See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 
526, 537 (1995) (“Petitioner’s skepticism . . . must give way to contemporary 
principles of international comity and commercial practice.”); id. at 537–38 
(“[T]he historical judicial resistance to foreign forum selection clauses ‘has 
little place in an era when . . . businesses once essentially local now operate 
in world markets.’” (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 
12 (1972))). 
48. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 634. 
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revisiting the preliminary contracts doctrine.49 
The questions on remand seem to suggest a nod towards the 
application of federal law if the brokers’ claims were found 
independent of the charter parties.50 The court ordered the  
parties to provide further briefing on the choice of law issues for 
claims independent of the charter parties.51 Notably, the court 
requested further briefing on whether certain claims were 
independent of the charter party, and if so, whether those claims 
should be subject to arbitration in London as a matter of contract 
law.52 If not, the court asked the parties to explain how the 
question should be resolved under federal law.53 
Part I of this Article will provide a background of the 
International Chartering Services (ICS) case which provides 
context for some of the issues raised in this Article. Part II 
discusses the practice of shipbrokering within the principles of 
agency law; Part III discusses the preliminary contracts doctrine 
under the law of admiralty to demonstrate that primary 
jurisdiction over maritime contracts lies with the admiralty 
jurisdiction of courts.  Part IV  introduces comparative principles 
of arbitration through an explanation of British maritime law and 
the English Rights of Third Party’s Act, and the Group of 
Companies Doctrine to demonstrate the human rights principles 
that lie at the heart of consent. Part V discusses choice of law 
rules in United States jurisprudence as it relates to international 
 
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 634, 643. 
51. Id. at 643. 
52. Id. (holding that “[a]dditional [b]riefing is [n]ecessary to [d]etermine 
[w]hether [p]laintiffs [h]ave [c]laims [i]ndependent of the [c]harter [p]arties”). 
53. Id. The Court requested briefing on the following issues: (1) “Should 
the question of whether Plaintiffs have claims independent of the 
charterparties [sic]—claims that cannot be arbitrated—be determined by this 
Court, or by the arbitrators in England?”; (2) “If the Court should make the 
determination, then as a matter of contract law, do Plaintiffs have claims 
against Defendants independent of the charter parties?”; (3) “If Plaintiffs’ 
claims are independent as a matter of contract law, is there any reason why 
they must still arbitrate such claims under the charter parties? For each of 
these questions, the parties should (a) address whether English or federal   
law applies, (b) explain how the question should be resolved under English 
law . . . .”; (4) “Finally, the parties should address what would happen if the 
Court, applying federal law, determines that Plaintiffs must arbitrate all of 
their claims in London—yet under English law, the arbitrators would refuse 
to hear some or all of those claims.” Id. 
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arbitration issues. Part VI provides a discussion of the modern 
trend in the courts for joining non-signatories to arbitration 
through the surrogate principles of direct benefit estoppel and the 
Group of Companies Doctrine. Part VII signals the dangers for  
the forced nature of arbitration that lies hidden in standard form 
contracts used in the maritime industry, and Part VIII cautions 
against the potential threat of forced arbitration to the need for 
arbitration in the international legal system. Finally, the Article 
concludes with the importance of consent as the bedrock of 
arbitration, and the pivotal role that consent plays in the ongoing 
quest for uniformity and certainty in the international legal 
system of commercial law and arbitration. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
A. The Charter Parties 
Plaintiffs, shipbrokers International Chartering Services 
(ICS) and Peraco Chartering (USA) LLC (Peraco), filed a 
declaratory judgment in state court for breach of contract and 
breach of maritime contract on the basis that defendants, thirteen 
vessel owners (ship-owning defendants) that were wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Defendant Anemi Maritime Services S.A. (Anemi), 
were liable for commissions payable under brokerage 
agreements.54 At the time the charter parties were signed, Anemi 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of non-party Kyrini Shipping Inc.55 
After the contracts were finalized, Anemi and its  subsidiaries 
were purchased by Eagle Bulk Shipping, Inc. (Eagle), making 
Eagle and its wholly owned subsidiaries the defendants in this 
case.56 
In 2006, ICS arranged meetings between Anemi and Korea 
Line so that the two entities could discuss the chartering of 
Anemi’s vessels (the thirteen vessels at issue in this case).57 In 
2007, Korea Line and Anemi signed four master charter parties 
with each chartering multiple ships.58 The charter parties were 
between Korea Lines and Anemi. Anemi designated the thirteen 
 
54. Id. at 632–33. 
55. Id. at 632. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 633. 
58. Id. 
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ships at issue in the case. The charter parties provided that: 
“[S]hould any dispute arise between Owners and the Charterers, 
the matter in dispute shall be referred to three persons at 
London.”59 Each of the four charter parties also  contained  a 
choice of law provision, which stated: “This Charter Party shall be 
governed by the English Law.”60 
Shortly after the charter parties were signed, Eagle  
purchased Anemi and its subsidiaries. ICS, Plaintiffs, were not 
signatories to the charter parties.61 However, they served as the 
deal breakers in that they participated in the negotiations 
between Anemi and Korea Line.62 The resulting charter parties 
provided commission rates payable to ICS.63 ICS argues  that 
these commission rates with Anemi were negotiated separately 
from the charter parties.64 They contend that the commission 
rates were memorialized in an email dated May 4, 2007.65 
B. Modifications of Agreements 
During the market downturn starting in 2007–2008, Korea 
Line became insolvent, and entered into rehabilitation  
proceedings in the Seoul Central District Court in Korea.66 As 
part of the rehabilitation process, Korea Line, Anemi and the ship- 
owning defendants negotiated modifications to their  
agreements.67 Notably, Eagle was not a party to these 
modifications. The modifications created a “suspension period” of 
one year and provided that the owners “would seek other 
employment for their vessels, with Korea Line guaranteeing a 
minimum income of $17,000 per vessel per day.”68 After the one- 
year suspension period, the ship-owners would resume working  
for Korea Line “at a reduced rate of hire, but subject to a profit- 
sharing agreement.”69 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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C. The Case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
Eagle informed ICS (Plaintiffs) in December of 2011 that “it 
would not pay their commissions during the suspension period.”70 
Plaintiffs then sued Eagle in the Supreme Court of New York for 
New York County, bringing various claims including: breach of 
contract, breach of maritime contract, willful frustration of 
contract, unjust enrichment, and accounting.71 Defendants filed a 
motion to have the case removed to the District Court.72 In 
response, Plaintiffs contended that “their claims did not arise 
under the charter parties at all, but rather stemmed from a 
separate contract memorialized in the May 4, 2007, emails.”73 
In addition, Plaintiffs argued that “even if their claims did 
arise under the charter parties, they were not bound by the 
arbitration clauses” in the charter parties executed between 
Anemi and Korea Line.74 The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York denied the owners’ motion to compel 
arbitration under the charter parties.75 The Defendant ship 
owners appealed the decision.76 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District 
Court’s denial on interlocutory appeal and remanded with 
instructions to perform a choice of law analysis.77 The Second 
Circuit held that “under English Law, Plaintiffs would be included 
in the phrase ‘Owners and the Charterers’” and would be 
interpreted   as   “assignees   from   the original  parties.”78 The 
District Court did not address the question of whether the 
commission agreements were independent of the charter parties.79 
On remand, the questions for the District Court to tackle were: 
“(1) whether federal or English maritime law should apply under 
federal maritime choice-of-law rules to the question of whether 
Plaintiffs’ claims under the charter parties must be 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 633–34. 
74. Id. at 634. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (citing Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 
557 F. App’x 81, 83, n.3 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
78. Id. (citing Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 557 F. App’x at 83). 
79. Id. 
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arbitrated, and if so, (2) whether Plaintiffs have claims that are 
independent of the charter parties and need not be arbitrated.”80 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the choice of law  
analysis would be outcome determinative, thus deeming it 
essential to the case.81 Both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals determined that, under federal maritime law, Plaintiffs 
were neither “owners” nor “charterers” and, if federal maritime 
law were to apply, the arbitration clause in the charter parties 
would not apply.82 
This gap between United States law and English law as it 
relates to shipbrokers signals that the time is ripe for United 
States law to carve out a bright line rule as to the jurisdictional 
“saltiness” of brokerage contracts. From the English line of cases, 
it is clear that shipbrokers contracts are considered maritime in 
nature because of their interdependence with the charter party.  
In the United States, however, there is a judicial reluctance to 
bring these contracts into the charter party, and hence into 
maritime jurisdiction. This jurisdictional ambivalence creates 
uncertainty in maritime law and has the potential to promote 
uncertainty in international trade. To understand the nexus of 
ship brokering contracts to maritime law, a brief description of the 
business of ship brokering is necessary. 
II. THE PRACTICE OF SHIPBROKERING83 
A. Agency Relationship 
It is axiomatic that all parts of the shipping industry cross 
international boundaries, and as such, the business of shipbrokers 
is an internationalized commercial activity. Shipbrokers are 
subject to the vagaries of the international freight market and 
must adapt to the conditions prevailing in the international 
market.84 The freight market runs on the exchange of 
 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. “A shipbroker is someone who arranges the ocean transport of goods 
and commodities by sea, the employment of a vessel or buys and sells ships 
on behalf of his clients.” A Career in Shipbroking?, BALTIC EXCH. (Aug. 2, 
2006), http://www.balticexchange.com/other-services/employment/careers- 
advice/index.shtml. 
84. See LARS GORTON ET. AL., SHIPBROKING AND CHARTERING PRACTICE 33 
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information. These information channels are facilitated through a 
network consisting of various parties: owners, time charterers or 
despondent owners, cargo owners, and charterers.85 These parties 
negotiate their transactions through intermediaries known as 
“shipbrokers” or “booking agents.”86 After negotiations are 
completed, a document, the charter party, memorializes the 
agreements between the owners and charterers of the vessel.87 
Generally, the function of a shipbroker is to act as a 
representative of his or her principal in charter negotiations.88 
The broker undertakes the obligation to work to the benefit of the 
principal and to protect the principal’s interests in the following 
ways: 
(1) The broker should keep both the owner and the 
charterer continuously informed about the market 
situation, the market development, available cargo 
proposals and shipment possibilities, and he should, in 
the best possible way, cover the market for the given 
positions and orders respectively. 
(2) The broker should act strictly within given authorities 
in connection with the negotiations. Sometimes the 
broker will have a fairly wide framework—a wide 
discretion—within which to work when carrying out the 
negotiations, with an absolute limit which must not be 
exceeded. 
(3) The broker should in all respects work loyally for his 
principal and should carry out scrupulously and skillfully 
the negotiations and other work connected with the 
charter. 
(4) The broker may not withhold any information from his 
principal nor give him wrong information. Nor may he 
reveal his principal’s business “secrets” and may not act 
to the advantage of the counter party in the negotiations 
in order to reach an agreement.89 
 
(6th ed. 2004). 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 39. 
87. See id. at 107. 
88. Id. at 40. 
89. Id. 
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B. Shipbroker Commissions: Agreements Outside of the Charter 
Party 
A broker is entitled to a commission when the broker brings 
together the principal and a third party, facilitating a meeting of 
the minds on the essential terms of the agreement.90 However, 
“[w]here a special contract exists, the broker’s entitlement to 
commissions is entirely dependent upon the language of the 
contract authorizing those commissions.”91 Where commissions 
are due on the negotiation of a charter party, the payment of 
commissions will depend on the language in the charter party. 
Thus, if a charter party states that commissions are “due ‘on all 
hire as paid under th[e] charter[s],’” then the right to commission 
will accrue only to the extent that hire was actually paid.92 In 
some cases, brokers will execute separate agreements outside of 
the charter party form to protect themselves in the event of 
cancellation of the charter party.93 
A factual question that arises in brokerage disputes is 
whether an obligation to pay commissions survives default or 
cancellation under the charter party.94 In other words, courts 
must determine whether the right to commission attaches to any 
subsequent transactions between owners and charterers. 
Generally, courts will find that a right to payment attaches where 
the ship owner has not sustained any implied or constructive 
losses or where there is no failure of performance, as in cases 
where there is either an assignment or a modification of the 
original charter.95 According to this view, brokers should lose the 
 
 
90. Tankers Int’l Navigation Corp. v. Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 
499 N.Y.S. 2d 697, 1987 A.M.C. 478, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
91. Id. (citations omitted). 
92. Id. 
93. See id. (holding that Broker not entitled to payment from settlement 
funds after cancellation of charter) (citing Lougheed & Co., Ltd. v. Suzuki, 
1926 A.M.C. 790, 796 (N.Y.A.D. 1926) (holding that, short of vessel owner’s 
willful default, all risks, which might interfere with the earning of hire  
should be shared by broker, and that all causes that where no hire earned, 
the broker was not entitled to commission)). 
94. Tankers Int’l Navigation Corp., 1987 A.M.C. at 483. 
95. Id. at 485 (citing Kane v. Neptune Shipping, Ltd., 1948 A.M.C. 1407 
(1948)). The Kane court held that “the broker was entitled to a recovery . . . 
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right to commissions only where there is no substitute 
performance. 
However, the issue of substitute performance becomes a bone 
of contention where there is a cancellation of the original charter 
party or a “fix-around” of the brokers to the original charter party. 
In this situation, some courts have held that, where there is a new 
charter party, which amounts to a “fix-around,” the brokers to the 
original charter party are not entitled to commissions.96 Nor 
would these brokers be vested with third party rights.97 This view 
is at odds with the English law, where ship brokers are deemed to 
be owners and charterers under the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act of 1999, and under the theory of assignment.98 The 
Rights of Third Parties Act and its attendant theory of 
assignment, though beneficial to shipbrokers who stand to lose 
commissions, can also force these brokers into admiralty 
jurisdiction and thus, arbitration.99 To understand this result, the 
next sections of this Article will explore the position of shipbrokers 
in the space of admiralty jurisdiction in United States and English 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on the theory ‘that performance under a modified agreement is not such a 
failure of performance as to cause the broker to forfeit his commissions.’” Id. 
(quoting Kane, 1948 A.M.C. at 1413). 
96. See, e.g., Tankers Int’l Navigation Corp., 1987 A.M.C. at 485. 
97. See Parsons v. Wales Shipping Co., 1987 A.M.C. 1576, 1580 (1986) 
(finding that there was no evidence to suggest that the contracting parties 
intended to confer a benefit on the brokers as third-party beneficiaries). 
98. See BOYD ET AL., supra note 33, at 50 (stating the Commissions 
Clause in the Charter Party “does not make the broker a party to the 
contract,” but under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the 
broker can now enforce the promise of the payment of commission); see also 
Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co., [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm)  [29] 
(Eng.) (holding that a broker was entitled to sue for commission under the 
charter party because the effect of the charter party clause was to confer a 
benefit on the broker). 
99. Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. Ltd., [2003] EWHC 2602 
(Comm) [42] (Eng.). 
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III. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES: SHIPBROKERS 
AND THE PRELIMINARY CONTRACTS DOCTRINE100 
Maritime law is unsettled in the United States regarding 
shipbrokers and the contracts they enter into. In International 
Chartering, the shipbrokers’ claims raised the issue of whether 
United States law recognizes shipbrokers under the “owners and 
charterers” provision in the charter party form.101 Generally, the 
New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) Forms Time Charter 
provides for arbitration of disputes between “owners and 
charterers.”102 “[T]he Court of Appeals held that if the charter 
parties’ arbitration clauses were interpreted under English law, 
[the Shipbrokers] would be included in the phrase ‘Owners and 
the Charterers’ as assignees from the original parties” to the 
charter party.103 
This conclusion is troubling because in the United States, the 
law is still in flux as to whether shipbroker contracts are 
enshrined within the admiralty. Both the District Court and the 
Second Circuit agreed that under United States law, shipbrokers 
are not considered under the “owners and charterers” designation, 
and claims arising from the shipbrokers contract will not be 
cognizable under the charter party.104 Historically, shipbrokers’ 
 
100. See Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 612 (1991) 
(overturning the Minturn Rule by holding that “rather than . . . excluding all 
or certain agency contracts from the realm of admiralty, lower courts should 
look to the subject matter of the agency contract and determine whether the 
services performed under the contract are maritime in nature”). 
101. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 634–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
102. BIMCO, ASBA & SMF, NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE TIME CHARTER 
PARTY EXPLANATORY NOTES (last revised Oct. 15, 2015) (hereinafter NYPE 
2015), available at http://www.smf.com.sg/pdf/NYPE%202015%20 
Explanatory%20Notes.pdf (“The New York Produce Exchange Form (NYPE) 
is the most widely used standard time charter party in the dry cargo sector of 
the industry. The first NYPE form was published in November 1913 and 
amended in 1921, 1931, 1946, 1981 and 1993 and for a sixth time with the 
2015 revision. The 1946 edition is arguably still the most commonly used 
version of the NYPE charter, although many of its twenty-eight clauses are 
commonly amended or replaced with numerous rider clauses.”). 
103. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 634 (citing Int’l 
Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F. App’x 81, 83 & n.3 
(2d Cir. 2014)). 
104. See id. (“[T]his Court held and the Second Circuit did not reverse, 
under federal law Plaintiffs are not included in the phrase ‘Owners and the 
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contracts were deemed as preliminary services contract, and not 
within the cognition of the admiralty law.105 Up until 1991, the 
rule set forth in Minturn v. Maynard stood for the proposition 
that, agency contracts, which also enveloped shipbroker services 
contracts, were per se excluded from admiralty.106 The Minturn 
per se exclusionary rule remained the standard until the Supreme 
Court announced a new rule in Exxon Corporation v. Central Gulf 
Lines.107 
In Exxon, the Supreme Court announced a new rule that 
agency contracts were not per se excluded from admiralty 
jurisdiction.108 Notwithstanding, the Court explained that its 
holding was a narrow one, that did not reach the general status of 
the preliminary contracts doctrine.109 Thus, the status of 
shipbroker contracts still languish in that empty space between 
federal and state jurisdiction. In a line of cases after Minturn, the 
Court ruled that actions of assumpsit were no longer  
automatically excluded from admiralty as long as the claim arose 
as a breach of a maritime contract.110 
The issue of what types of contracts come within the 
admiralty was decided in Insurance Co. v. Dunham,111 and should 
have settled once and for all the rule that any contract that called 
for the performance of maritime services or maritime transactions 
were squarely within admiralty jurisdiction. However, courts 
today still go to great lengths to determine whether shipbrokers’ 
contracts or agreements to pay commission are cognizable in 
admiralty law.112 The reason that courts still belabor this point is 
 
 
Charterers,’ and thus their claims under the charter parties would not be 
arbitrable.”). 
105. See Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. 477, 477 (1854), overruled by 
Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 612 (1991). 
106. Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 605. 
107. Id. at 612 (holding that “Minturn is incompatible with current 
principles of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts and therefore should be 
overruled”). 
108. Id. at 607. 
109. Id. at 612 (stating that the rule in Exxon is a narrow one removing 
“only the precedent of Minturn from the body of rules that have developed 
over what types of contracts are maritime”). 
110. See, e.g., Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 536 (1946). 
111. See New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S.  (11 
Wall.) 1, 22 (1871). 
112. See, e.g., id. at 26–29. 
 2018] MARITIME ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 73 
 
that others take the position that such agreements are within the 
confines of preliminary services contracts. And since the Supreme 
Court has yet to state a definitive rule for the preliminary 
contracts doctrine’s relationship with maritime law, the 
uncertainty persists.113 
It would seem that the determination could be an easier one if 
the rule in Dunham was given any weight. Dunham declared a 
truism that if the nature and subject matter of the contract makes 
reference to maritime service or maritime transactions, then that 
contract is a maritime contract.114 Moreover, in Kossick, the court 
focused on the substance rather than the form of the contract.115 
The substance, then, should be what animates the transaction. In 
the realm of shipbrokering, the efforts of the shipbroker give birth 
to the maritime transaction. The broker not only “fixes”  the 
vessel, but is also involved throughout the post-fixture process to 
the completion of the charter party.116 
In International Chartering, the court held that the plaintiffs 
were bound to the arbitration agreement under the doctrine of 
direct benefit estoppel.117 The court explained that “[w]ithout the 
charter parties, no right to commission would exist.”118 Thus, the 
existence of the commissions payable under the brokerage 
agreements was dependent upon the charter parties.119 Viewed 
within the lens of interdependency, brokerage contracts, though 
preliminary in nature, should be subject to admiralty jurisdiction, 
since these contracts become part of the charter party. The 
 
113. See Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 607 n.3 (explaining that the reason for 
the confusion is because “[t]he preliminary contract rule, which excludes 
‘preliminary services’ from admiralty, was enunciated in the Second Circuit 
as early as 1881. . . . In the Second Circuit, the agency exception to admiralty 
jurisdiction—the Minturn rule—has been fused with the preliminary contract 
rule.” (internal citations omitted)). 
114. See Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 27; see also Kossick v. United 
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736 (1933). 
115. See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742. 
116. See GORTON ET AL., supra note 84, at 39–42. 
117. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138  F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Plaintiffs are estopped from denying the 
choice-of-law provisions insofar as their claims arise under the contract. This 
is because ‘[a] party is estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate when 
it receives a “direct benefit” from a contract containing an arbitration clause,’ 
even if it is not a signatory to the agreement.” (citation omitted)). 
118. Id. at 637. 
119. Id. 
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charter party and the brokerage agreements, then, enjoy a 
symbiotic relationship.120 
Notwithstanding, the Second Circuit is still reluctant to 
include brokerage contracts in admiralty jurisdiction.121 This 
ambivalence on the part of the Second Circuit creates uncertainty 
in admiralty law. In a line of cases pre-Exxon, the court analyzed 
preliminary contracts, and held as a general matter that these 
contracts, such as freight forwarder services, were not cognizable 
in admiralty.122 In other words, these contracts were not firmly 
entrenched in admiralty because they were too remote from the 
tide of maritime commerce. 
At the same time, the district courts have observed that these 
contracts are not per se excluded.123 Instead, courts should 
perform a qualitative analysis, and inquire into the nature of the 
tasks to determine the character of the work to be performed.124 
In CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations Corp., the 
court held that admiralty jurisdiction over contracts that “relate[s] 
to a ship in its use as such . . . or to transportation by sea or to 
maritime employment is fairly said to constitute a maritime 
contract.”125 The court’s holding in CTI-Container Leasing 
signaled a willingness to avoid a per se rule on preliminary 
 
 
120. See id. (comparing this case with Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene 
Genovese & Gluck, P.C. v. John M. O’Quinn & Assocs., L.L.P., 523 F. App’x. 
761 (2d Cir. 2013) (attorney’s fees) and Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. 
Ass’n v. Henderson, Nos. 10 Civ. 8033(PGG), 11 Civ. 3869(PGG), 2013 WL 
1245451 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (insurance contract), and concluding that 
“a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable for commissions payable 
under the brokerage agreements and damages in the amount of such 
commissions . . . is a benefit that depends on the charter parties for its 
existence. Without the charter parties, no right to commission would exist. 
Indeed, the charter parties themselves incorporate the commission rates that 
Plaintiffs negotiated.”). 
121. See Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
122. See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 301 (2d 
Cir. 1987); Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson Corp., 739 F.2d 798 
(2d Cir. 1984). 
123. See Ingersoll, 829 F.2d at 302. 
124. See id. (holding that “[i]t is the character of the work to be performed 
under the contract that is determinative of whether the agreement was 
maritime”). 
125. Id. (quoting CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations 
Corp., 682 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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contract services.126 Since then, however, the Second Circuit 
appears to be receding from this friendlier shore. 
In Shipping Financial Services Corp. v. Drakos, the first case 
before the Second Circuit after the Exxon decision, the court made 
a drastic move. It disentangled itself from the convergence of 
agency contracts and preliminary contracts to avoid collision with 
the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Exxon.127 Yet the 
Second Circuit, although acknowledging its jurisprudential error 
of conflating the agency and the preliminary services contract 
doctrines, refused to carve out a rule for the doctrine.128 
While the contract at issue in the Drakos case was too 
removed from the action that was sued upon, the case presented 
an opportunity to further clarify the preliminary contracts 
doctrine.129 In the Drakos opinion, the court seemed to go the 
extra mile to hold fast to its historical jurisprudence that charter 
brokerage contracts are not cognizable in admiralty.130 In Drakos, 
the plaintiff broker sued based on a “fix-around.”131 His services 
never led to the formation of the actual charter party under which 
he was claiming commissions.132 Thus, the court correctly held 
that the plaintiff’s role in the charter party was preliminary.133 
Hence, his services were not maritime in nature because these 
services never resulted in a charter party.134 
 
126. See CTI-Container Leasing Corp., 682 F.2d at 380. 
127. See Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 
1998) (stating that “[a]lthough Exxon instructs that the per se agency contract 
exception no longer applies, it does not necessarily require a similar fate for 
the preliminary contract doctrine”). 
128. See id. 
129. See id. (stating that “Exxon now forces us to disentangle [agency 
contracts and preliminary contracts] and consider the possibility that while 
agency contracts are not a per se exception to admiralty jurisdiction, 
preliminary contracts may still be an exception to such jurisdiction”). 
130. See id. at 134 (“If The Harvey and Henry and Boyd were to remain 
good law after Exxon, they would apply to bar this claim from maritime 
jurisdiction.” (citing The Harvey and Henry, 86 F. 656, 657 (2d Cir. 1898); 
Boyd, Weir & Sewell, Inc. v. Fritzen-Halcyon Lijn, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 77, 79 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989))); id. at 132 (“The doctrine in this Circuit—set forth more 
than a century ago and upheld since—provides in pertinent part that 
disputes arising out of preliminary services contracts do not invoke maritime 
jurisdiction.” (citing The Thames, 10 F. 848, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1881))). 
131. See id. at 134. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See id. (holding that “plaintiff’s purported role in giving advice about 
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However, the court’s conclusion in Drakos provided a 
harbinger for the inclusion of preliminary services contracts in 
admiralty law. The court, while not announcing a bright line rule 
for the preliminary services contracts doctrine, hinted that there 
was “potential for charter party brokerage agreements to qualify 
for admiralty jurisdiction.”135 The questions set out in  the  
briefing requests in International Chartering could be an overture 
by the court to settle the issue.136 
United States maritime law has not characterized brokerage 
relationships as firmly rooted in maritime law.137 Thus, absent a 
clear assignment of rights that may provide for a maritime lien, 
maritime law is not automatically applied to shipbrokers’ 
commissions. In this same vein, shipbrokers’ commissions are not 
automatically excluded from maritime law either.138 It  is 
precisely this uncertainty that compels a bright line rule in the 
United States for this category of contracts. Until then, these 
contracts will continue to be tossed about in the courts by different 
winds of doctrine. 
IV. JURISDICTION OVER SHIPBROKER CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH 
MARITIME LAW: THE CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT 1999 
While the tenor of maritime law regarding shipbrokers is 
uncertain under United States law, the inclusion of these parties 
is more firmly entrenched in English law. Under English law, 
shipbrokers fall within the term “owners or charterers” under 
statute, as well as at law, under a theory of assignment.139 
 
 
seeking a subcharter in the Gulf lighterage trade” did not “elevate its status 
to anything other than a broker” and that plaintiff did not make an 
“affirmative showing that its contract [was] ‘maritime in nature’”). 
135. Id. (“We reiterate the fact-specific nature of our decision. Having 
failed to establish maritime jurisdiction under either the Exxon nature and 
subject matter test or the preliminary contract doctrine, plaintiff may not 
enjoy the benefit of bringing this case in federal court. In reaching this 
conclusion, we make no ruling as to the continuing validity of the preliminary 
contract doctrine, or the potential for other charter party brokerage 
agreements to qualify for admiralty jurisdiction.”). 
136. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
137. See CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Oceanic Operations Corp., 682 
F.2d 377, 380 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982). 
138. See Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. 477, 477 (1854). 
139. See Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 
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Furthermore, the authority to join parties is a function of the 
court.140 Arbitrators do not have the power to join non-signatories 
to a contract.141 
Nevertheless, English courts have allowed arbitration of 
claims where the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
applies, or under a theory of assignment. The underlying  
rationale is that common issues of law and fact necessitate 
joinder.142 In Nisshin Shipping Co., the court rationalizes this 
principle under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) doctrine 
under the ambit of assignment.143 Presumably, the Second  
Circuit in International Chartering Services, Inc. hung its hat on 
the principles articulated in Nisshin Shipping Co.144 But the 
rationale begs the question of whether forcing these parties to 
arbitrate violates the ECHR and American public policy. 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 came into 
effect on May 11, 2000.145 The Act has impacted the common law 
doctrine of privity of contract as it gives third parties the right to 
enforce contracts which “purport to confer a benefit” on them.146 
Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, a 
shipbroker is a statutory assignee.147 As such, if an arbitration 
clause is intended to confer a benefit on a third party, then that 
party can enforce the benefit, and as such is bound by the 
 
 
(Comm) [40, 42], [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38. (concluding that under the  Rights 
of Third Parties Act, a shipbroker is a statutory assignee). 
140. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 219 (“[The] 
inherent and statutory jurisdiction of the High Court . . . enables it to: (a) join 
additional parties . . . and (d) consolidate separate proceedings” in relation to 
court proceedings.). 
141. Id. (“The essentially consensual basis of arbitrators’ powers means 
that they have no inherent powers to make orders binding third parties (i.e. 
parties who are not privy to the arbitration agreement pursuant to which the 
arbitrator is appointed).”). 
142. Id. at 219–20. 
143. Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [40, 42], [2004] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 38. 
144. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 557  F. 
App’x 81, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2014). 
145. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31. 
146. See BOYD ET AL., supra note 33, at 34. 
147. Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [42], [2004] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 38 (Under section 1(4) of the 1999 Act, the third party “has in 
effect become a statutory assignee of the promisee’s right of action against the 
promisor . . . .”). 
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arbitration clause, although a non-signatory.148 
This rule has its genesis in the European Principles of Human 
Rights, under which the U.K. was forced to depart from the time- 
honored rule of privity of contract in order to preserve the rights of 
third party beneficiaries.149 But where the Act sought to protect 
these rights, it also created a tension where that same third party 
was compelled to bring its claim in arbitration, which in turn 
raised the issue of whether compelling the third party to arbitrate 
also infringed upon his right under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.150 
The House of Lords answered this question in the negative under 
the rationale that the assignment was a matter of law versus the 
intention of the parties.151 
Section 1(1) of the Act allows a third party to enforce a 
contract term in two situations: (1) where the contract expressly 
provides that the party may enforce terms in its own right, and (2) 
where the term purports to confer a benefit on the third party.152 
This provision is dependent on the construction of the contract to 
determine whether the parties intended the term to be enforceable 
by the third party. In Nisshin Shipping Co., the court held that a 
broker was entitled to sue for commission due under the charter 
party under section 1(1)(b) of the Act.153 
The Nisshin court also held that the broker’s claims were 
subject to the arbitration clause, even though the claim only 
referred to disputes between owners and charterers.154 While this 
decision by the Nisshin court benefits ship brokers in terms of a 
clear jurisdictional rule—brokers are “owners and charterers” 
 
148. See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31. 
149. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 232 (“However, 
section I of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 . . . enacts an 
exception to the doctrine of privity by enabling a third party to enforce, in his 
own right, terms in a contract either where there is an express provision 
allowing such enforcement or where, subject to a contrary intention, the term 
purports to confer a benefit on him.”). 
150. See Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [35, 52–53], 
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38 (discussing ECHR, Art. 6(1)). 
151. See id. at ¶¶ 35–37; see also El Nasharty v. J. Sainsbury Plc [2007] 
EWHC 2618 (Comm) [25, 33–34], [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360; Dep’t of Econs. 
Policy & Dev. of the City of Moscow v. Bankers Tr. Co. [2004] EWCA Civ 314 
[11, 27, 32], [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 179. 
152. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31. 
153. Nisshin Shipping Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm) [3, 10, 13–15, 21, 
23–24, 33], [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38. 
154. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 40, 42–44. 
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under the charter party—it has the effect of forcing them into 
arbitration.155 This rationale, then, allows the joinder of non- 
signatories who are seeking to avoid arbitration and have their 
day in court, which appears at odds with the ECHR and English 
law.156 
This effect has been challenged and criticized under The 
Human Rights Act of 1998, which came into force in England on 
October 1, 2000.157 The law slowly crept into the space of 
maritime arbitration, even if the primary purpose of the law was 
geared towards public law.158 Under the “conditional benefits” 
approach, English courts have held that a third party cannot seek 
to enforce a term in a contract without also accepting the 
obligation to arbitrate.159 
Under the ECHR, the principles underlying fundamental 
human rights have evolved into the commercial space of private 
law by ensuring procedural rights, such as evidentiary matters 
and the right to a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
 
155. Id. 
156. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 12. There have 
been attempts to argue that arbitration clauses as a whole should be found 
contrary to Article 6 of the Convention because they restrict access to a court 
hearing. Such attempts have been unsuccessful because Convention 
Jurisprudence accepts that, by agreeing to arbitrate, parties waive their 
rights to a court hearing under Article 6(1). 
157. Id. 
158. See id. (“The purpose of the Human Rights Act is to give effect, 
within English Law to the rights and freedoms protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This Convention is an international treaty 
drawn up in the aftermath of the atrocities of the second world war and the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg was set up to protect the 
rights recognised.”). 
159. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31. The arbitration 
provision of the Act provides: 
Where— 
(a) a right under section 1 to enforce a term (“the substantive 
term”) is subject to a term providing for the submission of 
disputes to arbitration (“the arbitration agreement”); and 
(b) the arbitration is an agreement in writing for the purposes 
of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
the third party shall be treated for the purposes of that Act as a  
party to the arbitration agreement as regards disputes between 
himself and the promisor relating to the enforcement of the 
substantive term by the third party. 
Id. 
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time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.”160 These procedural safeguards are mandated by Article 
(6)(1) of the Convention.161 These principles, however, while 
protecting the rights of parties to a fair hearing, also have the 
undesirable effect of forcing non-signatories into arbitration and 
denying them access to the courts. This restricted access to a  
court hearing has been criticized as contrary to Article 6 (1) of the 
ECHR.162 However, courts continue to hold that under ECHR 
jurisprudence, an agreement to arbitrate waives the right to a 
court hearing.163 This reasoning ignores the effect on parties who, 
in fact, are not signatories to the underlying contract and thus, 
have not agreed to arbitrate. In confronting this issue in 
International Chartering Services, Inc., the Second Circuit and the 
District Court, on remand, were forced to engage in a choice of law 
analysis under federal law.164 
V. CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS: FEDERAL MARITIME CHOICE OF LAW 
RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
A. Choice of Law Analysis: Federal Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a choice of law 
clause is presumptively valid where the underlying transaction is 
fundamentally international in character.165 In the maritime 
context, these clauses will be held invalid only when the foreign 
forum will apply its own substantive law, which would result in a 
lower recovery below a statutory amount.166 The line of cases 
decided on the principles in M/S Bremen and Sky Reefer did not 
 
160. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6(1). 
161. Id. 
162. See AMBROSE, MAXWELL & PARRY, supra note 16, at 12. 
163. See Nisshin Shipping Co. v. Cleaves & Co. [2003] EWHC 2602 
(Comm) [52–53], [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38; Dep’t of Econs. Policy & Dev. of the 
City of Moscow v. Bankers Tr. Co. [2004] EWCA Civ 314 [27]; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 179. 
164. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 634–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle 
Bulk Shipping Inc., 557 F. App’x 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2014). 
165. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); see 
also Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 
(1995). 
166. See Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 550–51 (Stevens J., dissenting) (arguing 
that COGSA’s prohibition against lessening statutory liability applies to 
foreign forum selection and arbitration clauses). 
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tackle the issue of non-signatories.167 
The Second Circuit has consistently held that a dispute is 
arbitrable if the court finds that the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate.168 However, the presumption of validity will be 
overcome if applying the choice-of-law clause would be 
unreasonable under the circumstances.169 In fact, in a line of 
cases, the Second Circuit held that non-signatories should not be 
bound by an arbitration clause because this practice offends U.S. 
public policy.170 Moreover, the Second Circuit unequivocally 
stated that an arbitration clause requires “clear and unmistakable 
intent” to enter into arbitration.171 
Generally, choice of law and forum selection clauses are 
unreasonable and will not be enforced: (1) if “incorporate[ing] [the 
clause] into the agreement was the result of fraud or 
overreaching”; (2) “if the complaining party will . . . be deprived of 
his day in court, due to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of 
the selected forum”; (3) “if the fundamental unfairness of the 
chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy”; or (4) “if the 
clauses contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.”172 
In evaluating whether any of these four conditions have been 
met, the Court will consider the following factors: (1) any choice of 
law provision contained in the contract; (2) the place where the 
contract was negotiated, issued, and signed; (3) the place of 
performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the contract; 
and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, 
and place of business of the parties.173 
 
167. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. M.V. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 
1336 (9th Cir. 1997); Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th 
Cir. 1997); Talatala v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Corp., 974 F. Supp. 1321 (D. 
Haw. 1997); Pasztory v. Croatia Line, 918 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
168. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration 
Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Chelsea Square Textiles, 
Inc. v. Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co., 189 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
169. Id. at 99. 
170. See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 661–62 (2d Cir. 
2005) (rejecting contract’s choice of Egyptian law in favor of arbitrability 
because its broad-brush willingness to bind a non-signatory to arbitration 
was “contrary to American public policy”). 
171. Id. 
172. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138  F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
173. See Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., 722 F.3d 
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Courts have applied federal maritime law to obligations 
arising under a charter party to determine issues arising under an 
agency relationship.174 In so doing, the court will employ the 
maritime choice of law rules established in Lauritzen v. Larsen.175 
In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman brought suit in the Southern 
District of New York under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Section 688, 
alleging that he was negligently injured aboard a ship of Danish 
flag and registry while in Havana harbor.176 The ship was owned 
by a Danish citizen, and the injured seaman had signed the ship’s 
articles providing that disputes would be governed by Danish 
law.177 Nevertheless, he sought to invoke United States law.178 
The Court held that even where United States law has the 
strongest connection to the relevant transaction, international 
maritime law will control.179 In focusing on the relevant 
transaction test, courts seek to protect the rights of third parties 
who may incur detriment because of the itinerant nature of 
maritime transactions.180 Therefore, courts will not enforce a 
choice of law or forum clause if enforcement “contravenes a strong 
 
 
488, 499 at n.11 (2d Cir. 2013). 
174. See id. at 497 (citing Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 
1980)) (“We applied federal maritime law, ‘which is the law we apply in an 
admiralty case,’ to determine whether an undisclosed principal was bound by 
contracts made by an agent acting within his authority.”). 
175. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953). In Lauritzen, the 
balance of factors clearly pointed to application of Danish law: the injured 
seaman had minimal contacts with the United States beyond the intangible— 
his desire to invoke this nation’s more favorable maritime tort law. 345 U.S. 
at 587. 
176. Id. at 573. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. See id. at 581. The Supreme Court laid out a multi-factor choice of 
law test, “[t]he purpose of [which,] is to assure that a case will be treated in 
the same way under the appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous 
circumstances which often determine the forum.” Id. at 591. 
180. See Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., 722 F.3d 
488, 499 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As is often the case in admiralty, we deal here with 
multi-national foreign parties locked in dispute as the result of an alleged 
breach of an international shipping contract. Indeed, part of the reason we 
authorize maritime attachment is the ‘peripatetic’ nature of maritime parties, 
the ‘transitory’ status of their assets . . . and the need for parties to obtain 
security ‘[i]n a world of shifting assets, numerous thinly-capitalized 
subsidiaries, flags of convenience and flows of currencies’ . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 2018] MARITIME ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 83 
 
public policy of the forum.”181 
Generally, courts will not view the choice of a sophisticated 
forum with a highly developed body of commercial and maritime 
law as a contravention to public policy. If the goal is to ensure the 
protection of a party’s rights, then a London arbitration is not 
likely to contravene public policy because the forum will be 
deemed reasonable.182 Where the choice of law clause is 
challenged as not binding on the parties, however, the court will 
employ a contacts analysis.183 The brokers in this case argued 
that all contacts were with the United States.184 Nevertheless,  
the court dismissed the United States contact factors because they 
were ancillary to the contract at issue.185 In addition, the court 
noted that the plaintiffs were not parties to the contract, and that 
the contacts analysis only applied to parties to the contract.186 If 
the court agrees that these brokers are not parties to the contract, 
then joining them to arbitration appears to be a collateral issue.187 
B. Choice of Law: Collateral Issues 
In choice of law cases where a court is engaged in an alter-ego 
analysis, piercing the corporate veil is an issue collateral to the 
contract, and courts are not bound by the choice of law clause in 
 
 
181. See See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 
F. Supp. 3d 629, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 
1353 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
182. See id. at 639 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS 
§ 187 CMT. F (AM. LAW INST. 1971)) (“[T]he Restatement specifically 
contemplates that parties to a multistate maritime agreement ‘should be 
permitted to submit their contract to some well-known and highly elaborated 
commercial law’ with no other connection to the transaction.”). 
183. See id. at 639. 
184. See id. at 641. 
185. See id. (“The contracts subject to contacts analysis are the charter 
parties in their entirety, not merely the minor provisions relating to 
Plaintiff’s commissions—and certainly not the May 4, 2007 emails, which 
Plaintiffs argue form an entirely separate contract.”). 
186. See id. at 642 (“[W]hen considering the domicile, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties, the 
Court looks primarily at the parties to the contract, not the parties to this 
lawsuit. However, despite their role in the contract negotiations, plaintiffs are 
not parties to the contracts, and thus their locations are less significant than 
those of the other participants.”). 
187. See Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., 722 F.3d 
488, 493 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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the underlying contract.188 In International Chartering, the court 
couched the joinder of the non-signatories under the doctrine of 
direct benefit estoppel to compel the plaintiff to arbitration in 
London.189 The doctrine of direct benefit estoppel provides that a 
party who claims an entitlement to payment based on the 
contractual obligations of a signatory is seeking a benefit under 
the contract.190 
However, in an earlier case, the Second Circuit stated that if 
suits based on brokerage contracts and their collateral claims 
regarding third party standing are brought within the admiralty 
jurisdiction, federal maritime law will control notwithstanding a 
choice of law clause.191 Whether a claim sounds in admiralty is a 
procedural question on the matter of the court’s jurisdiction.192  
On the other hand, the validity of a claim is a substantive issue 
that should be governed by the relevant substantive law: the law 
that defines the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the 
dispute.193 
In Blue Whale, one issue was whether a choice of law 
provision governed an alter-ego claim.194 The choice of law clause 
provided for arbitration in London, governed by British law.195 
The Court in Blue Whale held that the choice of law provision was 
preempted by federal law on the alter-ego claim.196 The 
determination of which law governs an alter-ego claim was 
complex because the court had to first decide whether the issue 
concerns the obligations under the contract or whether a party is 
an alter-ego. In the end, the court held that the alter-ego issue  
was collateral to the contract and, as such, the court was not 
bound by the choice of law clause.197 
 
188. Id. 
189. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 636–37. 
190. Id. (explaining that “[u]nder this doctrine of direct benefit estoppel, 
‘a non-signatory who claims entitlement to payment based on the contractual 
obligations of a signatory is seeking a benefit under the contract.’” (quoting 
Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n v. Henderson, Nos. 10-cv-8033, 
11-cv-3869, 2013 WL 1245451, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013))). 
191. See Blue Whale Corp., 722 F.3d at 496. 
192. Id. at 494. 
193. Id. at 495. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 491. 
196. Id. at 498. 
197. See Blue Whale Corp., 722 F.3d at 496. The court explained that 
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In International Chartering, the issue of joinder was not 
premised on an alter-ego claim as in Blue Whale because no 
corporate form questions were implicated in International 
Chartering.198 However, it can be argued that because these 
brokers are not parties to the contract, then the issue of joining 
them should also be governed by federal law, and thus, collateral 
to the payment of commissions. 
As the court explained, the plaintiffs are seeking a benefit 
that depended upon the charter parties for its existence, although 
plaintiffs contend that the benefits they seek are enshrined in a 
separate and independent agreement, which did not become part 
of the charter parties.199 Viewed in this light, plaintiffs are not 
seeking benefits that are dependent on the charter parties. 
Rather, if the agreement at issue is outside of the charter party, 
then it is more likely incidental to the charter parties, and not 
dependent upon it. 
VI. BINDING NON-SIGNATORIES TO ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT 
BENEFIT ESTOPPEL IN UNITED STATES LAW 
Federal courts have held that so long as there is some written 
agreement to arbitrate, a third party may be bound to submit to 
arbitration.200 However, ordinary principles of contract and 
agency law may be called upon to bind a non-signatory to an 
agreement whose terms have not clearly done so.201 In so holding, 
 
 
Blue Whale’s claim against HNA sounds in admiralty because it 
arose from this maritime contract—however, the substance of the 
attachment claim concerns whether HNA is an alter ego of 
Development. This corporate identity inquiry is indeed distant from 
the dispute over the charter party’s provisions regarding the 
transport of iron ore. For this reason, we find that “the issue of 
piercing the corporate veil is collateral to the contract, and thus this 
Court is not bound by the choice of law provision.” 
Id. (quoting United Trade Assocs. Ltd. v. Dickens & Matson (USA) Ltd., Inc., 
848 F. Supp. 751, 759 (E.D. Mich. 1994)). 
198. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138  F. 
Supp. 3d 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
199. Blue Whale Corp., 722 F.3d at 493. 
200. Carolyn B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua, Defining the Party—Who is a 
Proper Party in an International Arbitration Before the American Arbitration 
Association and Other International Institutions, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
711, 720 (2003). 
201. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
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courts have recognized six theories for binding a non-signatory to 
an arbitration agreement: (a) incorporation by reference; (b) 
assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing/alter ego; (e) estoppel; and 
(f) third-party beneficiary.202 However, these factors are not 
dispositive.203 At the bedrock of all the preceding factors is an 
overwhelming concern for public policy in United States law. 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) controls whether an 
American non-signatory agreed to be bound by arbitration.204 For 
example, in Sarhank, the arbitrators concluded that Oracle, a 
non-signatory to a contract, was bound by its subsidiary’s 
signature under an Egyptian choice of law clause.205 However,  
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that despite 
the choice of law clause, American Federal arbitration law  
controls and that an American non-signatory cannot be bound to 
arbitrate “in the absence of a full showing of facts supporting an 
articulable theory based on American contract law or American 
agency law.”206 
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp. held that the 
Federal Arbitration act applied to Ecuador, despite the fact that 
the New York Convention did not apply, as Ecuador and the 
United States were signatories to the Inter-American 
Convention.207 By so holding, the court appeared to clarify its 
holding in Sarhank by making a distinction based on the status of 
 
 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 202 (3d Cir. 2001); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. 
Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995). 
202. Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003); 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 269 F.3d at 195–202; Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64 
F.3d at 776. 
203. See ACE Capital Re Oversees Ltd. v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co., 307 
F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts employ a two-part test in 
determining the arbitrability of claims: “(1) whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate disputes at all; and (2) whether the dispute at issue comes within 
the scope of the arbitration agreement”); see also Specht v. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 2002); Thomson-CSF, S.A., 64 F.3d 
at 776 (stating that “[a]rbitration is contractual by nature—‘a party cannot  
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to 
submit’” (quoting United Steelworkers of Am.v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))). 
204. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 2005). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 
334, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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the party seeking the remedy, not the remedy itself. In the  
process, the court reconciled Motorola and Sarhank, and 
articulated that a choice of law clause will govern a non-signatory 
where the non-signatory seeks to compel arbitration, not where 
the situation is reversed.208 In sum, the court created a bright  
line that only non-signatories seeking to compel arbitration will be 
bound by a choice of law clause. In International Chartering, 
however, the court regressed from this line of demarcation, and 
clouded the water by pouring the doctrine of direct benefit  
estoppel into the analysis.209 
In International Chartering, the court held that compelling 
the shipbrokers to arbitrate their claim did not violate U.S. public 
policy against forced arbitration.210 It legitimized its holding 
under the doctrine of direct benefit estoppel, and the principles 
outlined in the earlier Motorola opinion.211 In Motorola, the non- 
signatory parties who were being sued by Motorola attempted to 
force Motorola to arbitrate its claims against them.212 In applying 
the Swiss choice of law clause in the contracts, the Second Circuit 
saw no concern with binding these non-signatories to the Swiss 
choice of law rules because they had invoked the arbitration 
clause; thus, under the principle of estoppel, they were bound to 
the choice of law clause.213 In its reasoning, the court dismissed 
the legally significant fact in Motorola; a cardinal sin in analogical 
reasoning.214 
 
208. See id. at 356. 
209. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138  F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 636. (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
210. Id. (stating that “[a]lthough Plaintiffs are not signatories to the 
charter parties, and they are not seeking to invoke the arbitration provisions 
in the contracts as were the defendants in Motorola, applying English law 
and requiring Plaintiffs to arbitrate does not go against American public 
policy”). 
211. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 51 (2d Cir. 2004). 
The court explained that there were no concerns about binding the non- 
signatory defendants, because if they “wish to invoke the arbitration clauses 
in the agreements at issue, they must also accept the Swiss choice-of-law 
clauses that govern those agreements.” Id. In other words, Defendants were 
bound to the choice of law clauses by estoppel, a theory rooted in traditional 
contract principles and acceptable to American public policy. 
212. Id. at 50. 
213. Id. at 51. 
214. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 636 (“[L]ike the 
Motorola defendants, Plaintiffs are estopped from denying the choice-of-law 
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In Motorola, the animating factor that triggered estoppel was 
that the non-signatories in this case invoked the arbitration 
clause, while at the same time denying the choice of law.215 
Conversely, in International Chartering, the non-signatories did 
not invoke the arbitration clause.216 In fact, the non-signatories 
did not claim benefits under the charter parties. Rather, their 
claims were based on a separate contract. Based on this fact, the 
plaintiffs in International Chartering were not like the plaintiffs 
in Motorola. They were just the opposite—they were non- 
signatories who did not wish to invoke the arbitration clause in 
the underlying contract. While there was some nexus to the 
charter parties, the question for the court was whether this 
separate agreement was subject to the arbitration clause. 
A determination of whether a party has agreed to submit a 
dispute to arbitration depends on the terms of the contract. 
Generally, non-signatories to an arbitration agreement can be 
compelled to arbitrate their claims in certain circumstances.217 
Where the non-signatory is suing directly under the agreement 
containing the arbitration clause or has directly benefited from 
such agreement, courts will employ the federal law doctrine of 
equitable estoppel to compel the non-signatory to arbitrate its 
claim.218 
 
provisions insofar as their claims arise under the contract. This is because 
[a] party is estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate when it receives 
a ‘direct benefit’ from a contract containing an arbitration clause,” even if it is 
not a signatory to the agreement.”). 
215. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 52–53. 
216. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d at 635. 
217. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 43; American Bureau of 
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 
World Omni Fin. Corp. v. Ace Capital, 64 Fed. Appx. 809, 812–13 (2d   Cir. 
2003); Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n v. Henderson, 2013 WL 
1245451 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013); Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene Genovese 
& Gluck v. John M. O’Quinn & Assoc., 523 Fed. Appx. 761 (2d Cir. 2013). 
218. Am. Personality Photos v. Mason, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 
2008) (holding that the owner of property found in a building during 
environmental remediation, which was a non-signatory to the remediation 
services agreement, could not be compelled to arbitrate its replevin and 
conversion causes of action against the owner of the remediation services 
provider based on a theory of equitable estoppel, where the provider’s owner 
failed to show that the property owner directly benefited from the agreement, 
the provider’s owner signed the remediation agreement as president of the 
provider and not in his individual capacity, while the claims were against the 
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Under the estoppel theory, a company knowingly exploiting 
an agreement with an arbitration clause can be estopped from 
avoiding arbitration despite having never signed the 
agreement.219 Where a company knowingly accepts the benefits of 
an agreement with an arbitration clause, even without signing the 
agreement, that company may be bound by the arbitration clause. 
The court in World Omni Financial Corp. explained that, under 
such theory, the benefits must be direct, which was to say, they 
must flow directly from the agreement, as opposed to indirectly, 
where the non-signatory merely exploits the contractual relation 
of parties to an agreement but does not exploit (and thereby 
assume) the agreement itself.220 
Where the third party is deemed a co-plaintiff of a non- 
adverse signatory, courts have generally not required the third 
party to arbitrate unless there is a showing that the claims are 
intertwined, and the non-signatory is seeking a benefit from the 
original agreement.221 This principle of “intertwinement” holds 
more potency to compel arbitration on the theory of efficiency and 
confusion. It stands to reason that if claims are so intertwined, 
then to promote judicial efficiency the claims should be heard 
together. This principle furthers the desired goals of efficiency  
and the avoidance of inconsistent judgments on the same issues or 
claims. 
 
president in his individual capacity, and the dispute was separate from the 
dispute between the agreement’s signatories that was already being 
arbitrated). 
219. See World Omni Fin. Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. at 812–13 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(insurance claimant received direct benefit from reinsurance policy to which 
it was not a signatory). 
220. See id. at 813. 
221. See, e.g., Chew v. KPMG, 407 F. Supp. 2d 790, 805 (S.D. Miss. 2006). 
The court in Chew found that the “intertwined claims” theory of equitable 
estoppel could not be applied by a non-signatory against a non-signatory any 
more than it could be applied by a signatory. Id. at 805. Thus, the court held 
that the claims against the accounting firm and law firm asserted in court by 
customers of the securities firm who had not signed any customer agreement 
containing an arbitration clause were not subject to the accounting firm’s or 
law firm’s motion to compel arbitration under the principles of equitable 
estoppel. Id. The court explained that even a signatory to an arbitration 
agreement cannot compel to arbitration a non-signatory to the agreement, at 
least under the estoppel theory that the claims of the signatory and non- 
signatory are intertwined with one another, and that what the movants were 
asking the court to do was one step further removed from that principle. Id. 
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In the International Chartering decision, the court viewed the 
shipbrokers’ relationship, not the separate contract,  as 
intertwined with the charter parties through the prism of 
dependency.222 The direct benefit estoppel doctrine articulated by 
the court is essentially an operation of the principle of deemed 
consent, frequently employed by arbitrators in the joinder of a 
non-signatory.223 Under United States law, the principle of 
deemed consent navigates through the doctrine of estoppel, while 
in some Continental legal systems, such as the French legal 
system, consent will be implied where a “chain” of transactions is 
established.224 
The principle of deemed consent was the hallmark of Dow 
Chemical, which also gave birth to the Group of Companies 
Doctrine.225 Under the Dow Chemical rubric, the assumption is 
that the party sought to be joined was involved in the initial and 
final stages of the transaction, i.e., the negotiation and the 
conclusion of the contract.226 Under this view, the elements of 
negotiation, conclusion and execution are merged to form the basis 
for the joinder. This prescription bodes well when the non- 
signatory invokes the favor of the arbitration clause. Arguably,  
the doctrine has a place for corporate veil piercing purposes. 
However, the doctrine does not hold any appeal to operate as a 
broad brush in the space of international commercial arbitration. 
This doctrine and other surrogates, such as direct benefit estoppel 
and assignment, should never be used as a prescription by arbitral 
tribunals for those who are non-signatories and do not desire 
joinder in international arbitration.227 
 
222. See Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 636–37(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
223. See Park, supra note 3, at 1.44–46. 
224. See Park, supra note 3, at 1.47. The American doctrine  permits 
courts to direct arbitration with respect to facts intimately intertwined with a 
cause of action subject to arbitration. Id. On the other hand, the French 
procedural framework of a claim will follow the transfer of substantive rights 
along a chain of buyers and sellers. In each case, the parties’ reasonable 
expectations require that arbitration be imposed by virtue of facts which in 
fairness must be assimilated to consent. Id. 
225. See Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, ICC No. 4131/1982; Win 
Line (UK) Ltd. v. Masterpart (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. [2000] 2 SLR 98, 118–19. 
226. See Park, supra note 3, at 1.72. 
227. Id. at 1.74 (“In Dow Chemical, the non-signatory did not resist 
arbitration, but wished to join a proceeding already initiated by its affiliates. 
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING: AMELIORATING THE 
COERCIVE NATURE OF STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 
Under traditional notions of privity of contract, a third party 
cannot be obligated to perform under a contract without the free 
and unfettered consent of that person.228 A corollary of the 
doctrine is that a third party did not have the right to sue to 
enforce a contract absent consideration flowing from the third 
party to the promisor, or from some other person at the promisor’s 
request.229 But the doctrine of privity of contract has always been 
at odds with mercantile practice, and does not comport with 
commercial realties.230 Thus, its death would not be mourned in 
the law of commercial transactions. However, with the death of 
the privity doctrine, the doctrines of implied or “deemed” consent 
gain strength, which means that the right of third parties to 
choose the forum and law that will govern their disputes is 
weakened or eradicated.231 This proverbial double-edged sword 
raises its ugly head in the joinder of non-signatories who are 
ensnared in the world of standard form contracts. The practice 
conflates freedom of contract and freedom from contract, which 
beg the question of whether it is fair and just to the non- 
signatory.232 
Given the current posture of English and American courts to 
compel third parties to arbitration, contract drafters must now be 
cognizant of contemporary approaches to contract law and make 
 
The non-signatory was able to show that ‘the application of the arbitration 
clause . . . conforms to the mutual intent of the parties.’ The party resisting 
arbitration had in fact agreed to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute. 
Id. The only issue was whether it would be compelled to honor that 
arbitration commitment with respect to affiliates of the otherwise legitimate 
claimant companies.”). 
228. See NEIL ANDREWS, CONTRACT LAW: THIRD PARTIES AND ASSIGNMENT, 
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND ‘BURDENS,’ 221 (Colum. Univ. Press, 2011). 
229. See id. (explaining the General Principle of Privity of Contract that 
contracts “cannot be thrust on parties behind their backs,” and that 
“[f]reedom of contract, a cornerstone  of  private  law  prevents  [a  third 
party] . . . from being burdened without his consent”). 
230. See Neil Andrews, Strangers to Justice No Longer: Reversal of the 
Privity Rule Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 60 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 353 (2001). 
231. See id. at 368. 
232. See BRIAN H. BIX, MODERN CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND 
CONTEXT, 128 (Cambridge U. Press, 2012). 
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sure to draft appropriately to avoid malpractice. Adopting 
elements from the law of trusts when drafting contract arbitration 
clauses is instructive. In the law of trusts, express language is 
required in order to confer a right on a third party.233 Thus, it 
should be expressly stated in the arbitration clause whether third 
parties are bound to resolve their disputes through arbitration. 
This means that standard forms must now include a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause alongside an exclusive jurisdiction clause. In 
addition, given the reach of the Act, forms should include an 
exclusion clause, which gives third parties the right to exclude the 
1999 Act if the contract calls for dispute resolution in London.234 
Such clauses will benefit third parties. The implication here, of 
course, is increased transaction costs in the revision of the various 
standard forms used in shipping and also insurance contracts 
involved in the carriage of goods.235 But, when compared to the 
costs to have a court determine whether third parties are bound to 
arbitration, the benefits of revising standard forms outweigh the 
costs of litigation and provides certainty to all parties. 
VIII. DEFECTIVE CONSENT: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERCEPTION OF 
ARBITRATION AS LITIGATION’S GENTLER COUSIN 
The disposition of the International Chartering case is a 
harbinger of a trend in United States courts to favor the joinder of 
non-signatories to arbitration.236 This practice signals a reversal 
from the posture of United States jurisprudence to ensure parties 
consent to arbitration. By treating the right to payment for 
services under the principle of direct benefit estoppel, courts seem 
poised to unlock an arbitration clause from its moorings as an 
agreement between signatories to descend upon anyone who 
provides ancillary services. 
Although there are strong Supreme Court precedents under 
the FAA237 to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts, recently, 
 
233. See, e.g., Fornazor Int’l, Inc. v. Huntsman, No. 2:14-CV-291 TS, 2015 
WL 6142962, at *8 (D. Utah Oct. 19, 2015) (“Under Utah law, ‘only if the 
written contract’s clear intent is to confer rights upon a third party may that 
third party enforce rights and obligations of the contract.’”). 
234. See ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 215. 
235. See NYPE 2015, supra note 102. 
236. Int’l Chartering Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc., 138  F. 
Supp. 3d 629, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
237. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–16 (2012). 
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mandatory arbitration is being challenged in the United States, 
particularly in consumer transactions. In recent  times,  
mandatory arbitration provisions have been attacked as an 
exploitative tool, as it relates to members of the military.238 
Challenges to mandatory arbitration provisions have been posed 
in other states, like California.239 Although these actions are 
grounded in protection of consumers from exploitative practices, 
third parties who provide ancillary services to large businesses are 
in need of protection as well. At the very least, these third parties 
should be informed of their rights by way of a properly drafted 
standard forms.240 
The swing towards joinder based on expediency deprives third 
parties of their day in court, and implicates human rights 
concerns. Unless parties make clear the intention to arbitrate a 
dispute, courts must not allow tentacles of an arbitration clause to 
reach out and grip third parties in its grasp. In so doing, the 
practice offends the public policy concerns that underlie the rights 
enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, The Right to a Fair Trial,241 
the British Human Rights Act 1998,242 and American public policy 
underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).243 
Interestingly, the UK courts have interpreted the Contract 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1990 in the area of bailment law as 
conferring only benefits and not burdens on third parties.244 In 
terms of exclusive jurisdiction clauses, the Privy Council has held 
that an owner who is a non-party to the bailment contract  
between a bailee and a sub-bailee is bound to the clause only if the 
owner expressly or impliedly consented to the conditions in that 
 
238. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 987 (e)(3), (f)(4) (making mandatory arbitration 
provisions in consumer credit agreements with a member of the U.S. military 
unlawful and unenforceable). 
239. BIX, supra note 232, at 130 n.19. 
240. Id. at 140 (positing that refusal to enforce one-sided terms may 
“create incentives for better or fairer drafting of standard forms”). 
241. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 
No. 5. 
242. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
243. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
244. See ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 223 (“Bailment is a possessor’s (a 
bailee’s) responsibility for goods owned by the bailor (either an owner or 
someone with a right to possession). The bailee assumes responsibility to 
exercise reasonable care of the owner’s goods. This  relation  normally 
involves a contract between the bailor and the bailee.”). 
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contract.245 
Under both English and American commercial law 
jurisprudence, devices are available to contracting parties to 
structure their contract to provide notices to third parties 
regarding choice of forum and choice of law clauses.246 Where 
sophisticated parties fail to take advantage of drafting devices, the 
innocent party should not be punished for poor drafting. 
Himalaya clauses can facilitate the inclusion of a third party as if 
he or she was a party to the contract in chief.247 A Himalaya 
clause spells out the liabilities of third parties to a contract, and 
serves to provide certainty in commercial law.248 Although most 
Himalaya clause jurisprudence relates to maritime contracts 
concerning bills of lading, these clauses are applicable to all 
contracts involving third parties.249 At the very least, the broker 
commission section on the standard forms should be revised to 
include a “broker” clause that is tantamount to a Himalaya clause. 
The rise of third party litigation relating to third party benefits 
and burdens should signal to drafters a need to include 
Himalaya clauses that clarify these rights, thus closing the 
floodgates of litigation on this issue. Proper drafting to inform 
third parties of their rights in resolving disputes preserves respect 
and trust for the time-honored practice of consent to arbitration. 
When parties are properly informed of the choice of forum, 
arbitration will be less thought of as the commercial boogey man 
lurking in the shadows, and its rightful place as an antidote to 
litigation will be restored. 
CONCLUSION 
Where parties desire arbitration, the decision to join all 
relevant parties to arbitration is considerably easier than 
 
245. See, e.g., Watkins v. M/V. London Senator, 112 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 
(E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that a “Himalaya Clause . . . extends benefits to any 
agents, servants, or independent contractors performing ‘any part of the 
Carriage’”); ANDREWS, supra note 228, at 223 (citing The Pioneer Container 
(1994), 2 AC 324, PC). 
246. See, e.g., Watkins, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
247. See, e.g., Avikama Corp v. M/V Hanjin Marseilles, 162 F.3d 571, 574 
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that privity of contract is not required in order to 
benefit from a Himalaya clause). 
248. See id. at 574. 
249. Id. at 573. 
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compelling a party who is resisting joinder.250 To compel a non- 
signatory to arbitration triggers public policy concerns and the 
attendant issues of due process and fundamental justice.251 The 
joinder of non-signatories is a public policy concern in the United 
States, Britain, and Continental Europe. Given the rights at 
stake, courts and arbitral tribunals should tread cautiously when 
deciding to join a non-signatory who resists arbitration. Here, the 
decision becomes a “sword and shield” scenario, and the  
surrogates and substitutes that are employed to permit  
arbitration cannot be dispatched so readily to compel 
arbitration.252 
Under principles of comity and an increasing need for 
uniformity in maritime law, and international trade law, the task 
of upholding choice of law rules in international maritime 
contracts is a pressing one for courts and arbitral tribunals. To 
further the goals of certainty and uniformity, our Supreme Court 
has favored arbitration to ensure the survival of the international 
commercial system.253 Despite these valiant goals, the tension  
lies in promoting uniformity while at the same time protecting 
fundamental rights of fairness and justice. 
At the heart of these rights lies the element of consent.  
Where consent is contested, an arbiter must weigh facts with more 
scrutiny to preserve these fundamental rights. Where the 
resistance is based on the existence of an agreement separate from 
the contract containing the arbitration clause, the outcome hinges 
 
250. Park, supra note 3, at 22 (“The scrutiny and the evidence must be 
greater when an attempt is made to force (rather than to permit) joinder by a 
non-signatory. In joining a non-signatory, the evidence of consent would 
normally require special circumstances.”). 
251. See id. 
252. Id. (“Policy reasons as well as practical considerations make it 
difficult to compare a situation where the non-signatory does want to 
arbitrate with one where the nonsignatory does not want to arbitrate. In the 
latter instance, the drawbacks of parallel proceedings must be weighed 
against the serious countervailing considerations of imposing arbitration on 
clearly unwilling entities. When the non-signatory has never consented to 
arbitration, more analytic rigor and hesitation are in order before extension 
should be ordered. The very basis of arbitral jurisdiction is prima facie 
absent.”). 
253. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 631 (1985) (holding that the presumption in favor of a choice of forum 
clause “is reinforced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute 
resolution”). 
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on whether the arbitration clause is reasonable.254 But, 
“reasonableness” should not be based only on the sophistication of 
the commercial and maritime laws of a given forum. Rather, 
whether a clause is reasonable should depend on whether parties 
had notice and an opportunity to agree on the choice of forum. 
Informed consent lies at the heart of reasonableness. 
While the international system cries out for uniformity and 
certainty in commercial law, these goals should not displace the 
primordial right of consent that has been enshrined in arbitration 
since time immemorial. Joinder should be the exception where 
non-signatories are concerned, not the rule. The Second Circuit 
acknowledged this principle in its precedent cases.255  The  
practice of joining non-signatories to arbitration have also been 
rejected as repugnant to English law and other Continental 
countries.256 Legal surrogates like “direct benefit estoppel,” 
“conditional benefit” or “economic reality” serve as destabilizing 
forces in the system of arbitration. 
The practice of forcing non-signatories to arbitrate co-opts the 
fundamental right of parties to consent to arbitration. Consent is  
a primordial favorite of the law. In the end, the practice does not 
 
 
254. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1362–63 (2d Cir.1985). 
255. See, e.g., id. at 1360. 
256. See Park, supra note  3, at 24  (noting  that, outside of France, few legal 
systems welcome the group of companies’ doctrine; for example: the English 
decision in the Peterson Farms case was clear in its disapproval, stating that 
an arbitral tribunal’s approach in applying the doctrine was “seriously 
flawed,” and concluding that “where an arbitration agreement (or the contract 
in which it is contained) is subject to English law . . . an ICC arbitral tribunal 
has no jurisdiction to apply the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine”); see also id. at 
27 (“The tribunal found no evidence of consent to arbitrate merely because the 
non-signatory participated in the contract negotiation, noting “[i]f the 
Claimant had intended [the non-signatory] to be a party to either the Contract 
or its arbitration clause it could have so insisted at that time.”); id. at 26 (“The 
tribunal refused to extend the arbitration  clause to non-signatory 
respondents, and expressed skepticism with respect to the group of companies 
doctrine generally. There was a finding that the non-signatory’s mention of 
‘our company’ and ‘our agreement’ were irrelevant, given that the reference 
was clearly on behalf of the signatory entity.”); Petersen Farms, Inc. v. C&M 
Farming Ltd. [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm) [47] (Eng.). In the context of the 
Group of Companies doctrine the agreement was that Arkansas law was the 
same as English law. As I have already said, English law treats the issue as 
one subject to the chosen proper law of the Agreement and that excludes the 
doctrine which forms no part of English law. 
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promote the desired goals of uniformity in international 
arbitration. Rather, where arbitrators are given carte blanche to 
make public policy, the central purpose of neutrality in the 
arbitral process is weakened, and the space of international 
arbitration is flooded with uncertainty, and mired in allegations of 
injustice. The practice of arbitration must get back to its 
primordial roots of building bridges between parties, instead of its 
current trend of building walls against justice. 
